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T

he European Union (EU) is building the institutional capability to play a
larger role in global security affairs and there is an acknowledged need for
it to develop improved power projection capabilities if it is going to engage in
the full range of crisis management tasks. European militaries, however, are for
the most part still in the process of transforming themselves from static defense
forces into deployable units that are useful for the sort of crisis management
missions in which the EU envisages itself playing a larger (and more independent) role in the future. In doing so, Europeans will encounter distinct costs that
have only been partially dealt with to date.
We should not discount the progress that has been made in pooling
assets as a way to manage the costs of European ambitions, but there are nearterm and long-term trends that will significantly impact European spending on
defense and foreign affairs. In the near term, there is the on-going sovereign
debt crisis in the Eurozone that has obvious implications for spending across
the board. Yet, even if this is solved in a relatively painless manner, there is a
more consequential long-term demographic trend in Europe that will impact
spending for security and defense for many years to come.
The consequences of Europe’s fiscal difficulties for the United States’
economy are self-evident, but there are security consequences to consider as
well. Although it is easy to dismiss European militaries for their relatively
small contributions to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US-led
military operations, those militaries compose the vast majority of the assistance the United States has received in global military operations since the end
of the Cold War. A rapid decline in the ability of European states to fund their
militaries would mean that the United States would be faced with conducting
future operations without significant contributions from the militaries with
which it has developed 60 years of standardization and coordination through
the NATO alliance. Even more of the burden of global security operations
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would be shifted onto the United States while it is attempting to cut defense
spending and modernize aging weapons systems and platforms.
European miltary contributions to NATO and US-led operations are
modest, but they do add up. In Afghanistan, for example, the member states of
the European Union contribute approximately 35,000 of the 130,000 forces in
the country.1 European partners supply close to 90 percent of all non-US forces in
the country with most of the remainder supplied by Australia and non-EU allies
such as Turkey. In other words, European militaries supply a number of boots on
the ground roughly equal to forces in the surge implemented by the United States
in 2010. If European defense budgets continue to collapse and those states are no
longer capable of their current level of contributions to ongoing operations, the
United States armed forces will be stretched further than they currently are and
lose a degree of strategic flexibility in terms of a surge capacity that has been
employed with limited success in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The ability of European states to manage the effects of the dual storm
of the financial crisis and the long-term demographic shift on their military
capabilities will be determined by two factors. First, their ability to shift funds
within existing defense budgets away from personnel and toward operations and
procurement. Second, their ability to manage the process of base closures across
Europe as a whole and rationalize their defense infrastructure on a European
rather than a purely national basis. This is a process that is far more likely to
occur within the context of the European Union and the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) rather than in a NATO context because of the higher
public popularity of the CFSP in Europe compared to public enthusiasm for the
tranatlantic alliance.2 If the CFSP is successful, the United States will likely have
European partners capable of participating in future operations at levels similar
to current levels. If it is not, European militaries are likely to be so underfunded
in the coming decades that they will not be able to maintain a sustained presence
outside of Europe. This would mean that the ability of the EU to function as a
security provider in a global context (the goal of the CFSP) would be severely
compromised and that the current level of EU action outside Europe would
represent its high-water mark. Although this may not appear highly relevant
in a purely American context, this turn of events would increase the burden on
the US military at a time when many in Washington are looking to the defense
budget as a source of long-term savings. Simply put, the United States would
no longer be able to count on the current level of participation of European militaries in its international coalitions and would have to make up the difference
through an increased commitment of American personnel and resources.
The United States has a considerable amount at stake in the successful
development of CFSP even though it is designed to give the EU an ability to
play a more independent role in global affairs. It can be argued that a failed
CFSP would be a net gain for the United States because it would eliminate
a potential competitor for influence in the international enviroment, but this
misses the fact that European and American security interests coincide on
many basic issues. States on both sides of the Atlantic are vulnerable to the
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fallout of failed and failing states and most of their current military operations,
be it the counterpiracy mission off the coast of Somalia or the NATO mission
in Afghanistan, revolve around this issue. It is likely that a transatlantic alliance
will endure based on mutual security interests. Yet, given the short- and longterm financial constraints on European defense spending, significant changes
will need to occur that rationalize European defense spending in a Europeanwide program rather than in independent national efforts. Such a program can
only be implemented by the European Union through the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
This article first examines the consequences of the sovereign debt
crisis in Europe. It then considers the longer-term effects of the demographic
shift in Europe and the consequences of a rapidly aging population on defense
spending. Finally, it offers some potential steps forward including introducing
a defense infrastructure rationalization process in Europe similar to the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process implemented in the United States
starting in the 1990s.

The Debt Crisis and Its Effects on Spending
The global economic downturn and the sovereign debt crisis have
distinct implications for defense spending across Europe. Although there are
variations across the member states, the aggregate figures for 2008 and 2009
are telling. In that period Europe-wide Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank
by 5.6 percent. Overall government expenditure rose by 2.4 percent between
2008 and 2009 while defense expenditures fell by 3.5 percent.3 In other words,
while European governments on average attempted to alleviate the effects of
the global economic downturn through increased spending, they also shifted
resources away from defense budgets to partially defray those expenditures. It
is, of course, impossible to balance the national budgets of the members of the
EU through cuts in defense expenditures that only in a few countries amount to
more than 2 percent of GDP, but in times of fiscal constraint, European defense
budgets are a relatively easy target for reductions.
The member states of Central and Eastern Europe are enacting severe
cuts in defense expenditures over the next few years. Bulgaria enacted a 40
percent cut in its budget for 2010. The Czech Republic reduced its defense
budget by 20 percent between 2008 and 2011, and Latvia cut its defense budget
by nearly 50 percent between 2008 and 2010. The more established and wealthier
members of the EU are also making significant cuts. Austria is seeking to trim
its budget by 20 percent by 2015 and Germany is attempting to implement a 25
percent reduction in the same time frame. The two members comprising the
bulk of the EU’s deployable capability, France and the United Kingdom, plan
less dramatic cuts. Both expect to cut their defense budgets by approximately
7 percent by 2015.4
It is overly optimistic to assume that those reductions represent the
bottoming out of defense budgets because the sovereign debt crisis affecting
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and other states in the EU will be a burden on the
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rest of Europe for some time. Even if the sovereign debt crisis does not spread
beyond the states currently affected, the banking system in Europe is heavily
exposed to what were supposedly safe sovereign debt investments. Significant
government bailouts of French, German, and Italian banks may become necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system. As political leaders look to
find areas of savings in strapped financial times, they are likely to continue to
cut into defense and foreign affairs budgets to make funds available for the more
critical functions of preventing bank failures and a liquidity crisis in Europe.
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland are minor players in international security affairs, but much of the rest of Europe will also be fiscally constrained for
some time as a result of their banks’ accumulation of sovereign debt. German
and French banks, for example, hold approximately 900 billion Euros in Greek,
Portuguese, and Irish debt that may become worth far less in the near future if
a restructuring of that debt becomes necessary.5 Investors in Greek sovereign
debt lost 50 percent of their investment and there is no guarantee that further
reductions will not be forthcoming.6
If Italy and Spain are added to this list of states that may be in need
of debt restructuring or bailouts, the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis
could dramatically expand. In order to prevent defaults that would have disastrous consequences for the viability of the common currency, holders of that
debt may be forced to accept large write-downs on their investments.7 Largescale public funding would then be required to ensure the viability of exposed
banks in Germany and France, and to some extent, this is already occurring:
The European Central Bank (ECB) announced in December 2011 that it would
loan nearly 500 billion Euros to more than 200 troubled banks across Europe.8
Given the large exposure of French, Italian, and German banks to questionable sovereign debt, it is highly unlikely that this will be the full extent of
either ECB or national involvement in bank bailouts. The risk that the common
currency will collapse is relatively low given the political capital invested. Yet,
the leveraged nature of the financial system in Europe means that it may be very
difficult to prevent the crisis affecting the peripheral countries of Europe from
having significant effects on the more economically robust members of the
currency union. As Peter Boone and Simon Johnson at the Peterson Institute
for International Economics ask, “If Italy has a disorderly crisis, how safe are
French banks? And if those banks aren’t safe, how safe is France’s sovereign
debt?”9 The lack of a satisfying response to this basic question is at the heart of
the matter and shows no sign of being resolved in the near term.
It does not take extreme scenarios such as the collapse of the Euro or
the exit of Greece from the common currency to project an extended fiscal
crunch across Europe that will force governments to channel funds to maintain the stability of the banking system. Although the Greek crisis has already
been factored into the equation and likely can be managed without additional
intervention to support the banking sector, the equation changes significantly if
Italy and Spain are added as variables.10 As two of Europe’s larger economies,
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the contagion of the sovereign debt crisis to Italy and Spain could force large
interventions to prevent panic.
Although defense spending is a small percentage of total government
spending, it represents a target of opportunity for national leaders seeking
additional budgetary savings and ways to channel existing resources toward
the critical function of stabilizing the banking sector. Compared to other budget
items that the public is deeply concerned about such as health, pensions, and
other direct benefits, defense is not a core concern of most Europeans and there
are few domestic political ramifications to cutting the defense budget.

The Effects of an Aging Europe
The debt crisis and its impact on European budgets is a relatively
short-term problem; the longer-term issue for European defense budgets is a
demographic shift with profound consequences. As a number of studies conclude with some detail, the population of most European countries is aging
rapidly, meaning that growing expenditures for retirement benefits and health
care for the aged will be paid from a constantly shrinking tax base.11 At the same
time that the European Union is attempting to build a Common Foreign and
Security Policy that will permit it to play a larger role on the global stage as a
security actor, the member states of the EU will be set upon by a host of difficult
choices. Choices whose likely resolutions will deprive the EU of the financial
resources required if it is to play a role in military operations outside of Europe.
The average age of the population of Europe will increase dramatically
in the next twenty years. The median age in Germany and Italy, two of Europe’s
most populous states, will be 50 in 2030; by comparison the current median
age in Florida, the “grayest” state in the United States, is 42.12 According to
estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, given current
benefits, each retiree in Germany will have to be supported by 1.6 workers, while
each Italian and Spanish working-age person will have to support one retiree.13
Across Western Europe, the over-65 population will increase by 40 percent by
2030 while the working age population is expected to continue to shrink, even
factoring in current levels of immigration.14 The consequences of this situation
are unavoidable and there are no solutions that do not involve distinct changes
to the nature of the welfare state as it currently exists in most of Europe. Either
benefits will have to be reduced, taxes will have to increase, governments will
have to borrow more to sustain the aging population, or immigration will have
to sharply increase to supply the workforce and rebalance the population.15
Some members of the EU are already engaging in reforms along these
general lines, but none of those options are attractive. The political consequences of these reforms are readily apparent to those leaders who face protests
over increases in retirement ages or university fees in France and the United
Kingdom respectively. The negative political consequences of taking such
actions to ensure the viability of the welfare state directly impacting citizens’
current benefits or incomes makes another option more likely in the near future:
shifting resources from other forms of government spending to maintain the
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pension system. Among the likely candidates for cuts are defense and international affairs budgets which lack a strong constituency in the face of competing
demands from European publics accustomed to generous social benefits and
security guaranteed by the United States.16
Over the next several decades, Europe likely will have fewer resources
to devote to international affairs. An aging population will require more and
more resources and there will be fewer working-age individuals whose income
can be taxed to pay for benefits. Some changes can and are being implemented,
such as raising the retirement age and shifting health care toward private insurance-based programs, but in the near future governments will likely continue
to trim spending on international affairs, the military, and foreign assistance
programs. Simply put, a proposal to cut benefits to the fastest growing segment
of the population has political consequences at the voting booth, but reducing
spending on defense and international affairs has little domestic political cost
among most European publics.

National Defense Budget Trends
The broad budgetary picture provides some indication of the overall
trends across European defense budgets. From 2001 to 2009, total European
defense spending declined from 251 billion to 218 billion in inflation-adjusted
Euros.17 At the same time, however, spending per soldier increased from 73,000
to 91,000 Euros. This is a reflection of the large-scale drawdown in the overall
size of European militaries, many of which underwent a process of professionalization as conscription was phased out in France and other member nations
of the EU.18 On the one hand, this is an encouraging development in that more
resources are being spent on each individual member of the force. On the other
hand, the force structure in most European militaries remains relatively inflexible and incapable of sustained expeditionary operations.19 The draining effect
on France and the UK of operations over Libya is an indication of the current
limits to Europe’s deployable power, and those two countries represent the bulk
of Europe’s expeditionary capabilities.20
One way in which scarce resources can be used to greater benefit is by
pooling and sharing. Across Europe, there is considerable duplication of effort
in a range of areas that impact national defense budgets; pooling resources
and asset sharing can wring greater effectiveness out of increasingly limited
resources. For example, the European Air Transport Command at Eindhoven,
the Netherlands, allows participating states to maximize the use of heavy-lift
capabilities in the most efficient way possible. In May 2011, defense ministers
from across the EU signed an agreement on the administrative arrangements for
the European Air Transport Fleet, which aims to improve EU airlift capabilities.21 Other efforts are underway to improve the coordination of maintenance
facilities for aircraft across Europe.
But there are limitations to the gains that can be made from such pooling
and sharing arrangements. Most significantly, there are political obstacles
to pursuing these cost-saving measures. Pooling maintenance, for example,
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requires that some maintenance facilities be closed to consolidate the work in
fewer locations. Yet which facilities to close, and where to sacrifice the jobs of
those who work at those facilities, is a difficult question at best that required
complex negotiations in the United States to balance the facilities closures
between the individual states.22 It can only be an even more difficult process
in Europe among sovereign states, particularly during an economic downturn.
At the same time, some members of the EU are finding that pooling
and asset sharing have not produced the gains they expected. Germany, for
example, is planning to engage in fewer such arrangements in the future because
expected savings did not materialize.23 This does not mean that pooling and
asset sharing is a dead end in terms of bringing greater efficiency and cost
savings to European militaries. Yet, it cannot be invoked as a mantra that will
solve the large-scale mismatch between European ambitions and resources.
Most decisions on pooling and asset sharing will have political and economic
consequences as expected savings often come from closing facilities and cutting
positions. As members of the EU seek to move beyond the low-hanging fruit of
airlift coordination to the more potentially contentious issues of pooling national
maintenance facilities (with the attendant employment consequences) or developing truly multinational units, progress on such cost saving measures will tend
to compete against countervailing pressures to maintain the status quo. This is
not to dismiss the real gains that can be achieved from pooling and sharing, but
rather to underscore that those gains will not necessarily be easy to reap, nor
will they serve as a complete solution to the underlying budgetary challenges.
European militaries will be increasingly expected to do more with
existing or decreasing levels of funding; therefore, the challenge will be to
shift resources within national defense budgets so that more of those limited
amounts is spent on operations and procurement and less on personnel. Any
national defense budget rests on a tripod of resource investment on operations,
procurement, and personnel with smaller fractions being spent on infrastructure and research and development. Ideally, there should be a rough balance
between the three legs of the tripod in any nation or military that engages
in expeditionary operations. For the most part, European defense budgets are
heavily weighted toward personnel. Most spend well above 30 percent of their
national budgets on personnel and several, including Belgium and Portugal,
spend more than 70 percent on personnel.24
The result is that only a small fraction of each Euro in the national
defense budget is spent on operations or procurement. In other words, most
of the defense budget is spent on maintaining militaries that cannot go where
they are needed with the equipment necessary to perform the missions and
tasks that the EU has designated. Serious reform needs to start with recalibrating the balance between personnel and other expenditures within the national
defense budgets so that operations and procurement are favored in this era of
fiscal restraint. Unfortunately, the trend appears to be somewhat in the opposite
direction. In 2008, members of the EU spent an average of 54 percent of their
defense budgets on personnel. That number increased to 56 percent in 2009.25
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Conclusion
The preceding analysis begs the question: what can the EU do to ensure
that it can continue to play, and possibly expand, its role in the global security
arena? The answer is twofold. First, the EU will need to move forward with
internal reforms that permit the development of a truly European security
policy. Second, the EU will need to build a renewed transatlantic partnership
leveraging the respective strengths of the United States and the EU.
At the moment, most European militaries are downsizing, but doing
so independently of one another. What is lacking is a truly European strategy
for pooling and asset sharing that moves beyond satisfying national budgetary
concerns. The EU should draw on the experience of the United States in the
1990s for lessons learned. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission
(BRAC) essentially removed the base closure process from the political arena
and allowed for a rational downsizing of the US military at the end of the Cold
War. In Europe, however, this process needs to be predicated on the establishment of truly multinational organizations that are educated, trained, and based
together. Although there are some multinational formations and military colleges, they are a relatively small part of the overall package.
The second part of the answer is establishing an improved transatlantic partnership. For a long time, the United States has complained regarding
European allies’ inability or unwillingness to fund defense. The former US
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s valedictory speech to his European counterparts was only the most recent example.26 But the current security environment
makes it clear that both Europe and North America will likely face threats and
challenges arising from failed and failing states that require improved expeditionary capabilities. Both the European Security Strategy and the US National
Security Strategy outline these common threats in detail to include: terrorism
and proliferation, illegal immigration, organized crime, as well as the need to
assist in preventing humanitarian crises resulting from state failure.
A renewed transatlantic partnership should acknowledge the relative
strengths of both sides. While the United States has vast capabilities in strategic lift, logistics, surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance, Europe brings
a variety of skill sets to the table as well. In addition to the European militaries
compatibility with the US armed forces based on sixty years of close collaboration, many European states also have deployable paramilitary police forces that
provide a critical asset in the gray area between operations requiring military
forces and those categorized as civilian missions. Additionally, the EU’s rule of
law assistance missions could be further coordinated with US assistance missions.
Although it can be argued that such actions remove some of the independence of
CFSP and thus defeats its original purpose, that is not necessarily the case. In any
renewed transatlantic partnership focused on preventing state failure and dealing
with the consequences, the EU may be put in the position where it serves as the
junior partner. Clearly, this would be the case in purely military operations, but
the defining feature of the current security environment is that current operations
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require a mix of military, civil, and paramilitary assets, and in a number of cases
Europe possesses significantly more capability than the United States.
The EU can improve the match between its resources and its ambitions,
but it requires a realistic appraisal of what is possible in an era of financial
restraint. The still evolving sovereign debt crisis and the long-term demographic
shift across Europe will only constrain resources further in the coming years.
A failure to incorporate those factors into defense planning will set the EU on
a path of declining relevance in international security affairs.
Incorporating these factors will require a concerted effort on the part of
European political leaders to push for Europe-wide reforms. National defense
budgets in a number of EU member states will need to shift from personnel
expenditures to procurement and operations. Pooling and sharing of resources
will need to move beyond the relatively easy fixes of airlift and sealift coordination to areas that would have employment consequences in member states.
Finally, there is a need for a reassessment of the transatlantic relationship
required to build a partnership leveraging existing strengths and resources.
The future of European defense capabilities is not a purely European
affair. European militaries are a small, but significant, component of US-led
multinational operations. If those contributions cease to exist as a consequence
of the failure of the EU to cope with the dual pressures of the sovereign debt
crisis and the demographic shift, the United States will lose the vast majority of
the operational assistance it relies on in global security efforts. A failed CFSP
would ultimately increase the strain on US armed forces.
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